

1 and methamphetamine manufacture, and the same is true of Schutt's account. (RT. pp 399.)

2 Just before his death, Land had become "strung out." Detective Bloemendaal told
3 him he had to seek treatment for his obvious drug abuse, and Land was so desperate for
4 even the \$20 to \$100 that he got once he got someone arrested, he was begging
5 Bloemendaal for gas money. (RT. pp 444-464.) Land also bought \$100 of drugs from
6 Stacey Lucas, based on petitioner's word that he would pay. Then Land failed to pay
7 the debt, and petitioner felt obliged to assume the debt, which he told Lucas he
8 would repay in kind. But this was separate from the \$500 to \$600 deal with Lucas/
9 Bancroft, which Land told Bloemendaal would provide a "bust" on the morning of May 26,
10 1999. Land mentioned nothing of the \$100 buy to Bloemendaal, and it appeared to be a
11 separate private deal Land would be unlikely to report to his handler. (RT. pp 418-
12 421; RT. pp 681-682.) Thus, the "drug ripoff" in the context of this case could well
13 have been Land stiffing Lucas for drugs petitioner had to repay. But Lucas said she
14 had no indication petitioner planned on manufacturing the drug to pay this \$100 debt.
15 (RT. pp 681-682.)

16 The prosecutor also sought to downplay evidence of a classic heat of passion,
17 i.e., the personal insult of sexually harassing one's wife and friend and the
18 besmirching of one's credit with drug-using friends by not paying personal drug debts.
19 (See People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201; People v. Fenenbrock (1946 46-Cal.
20 App.4th 1688, 1704-1705.) To refute this as heat of passion evidence, the prosecutor
21 resorted to a variety of evidence. This included planning activity and word; the
22 manner of killing witnessed by Sarah Terry, per the Ranch and other witnesses; and
23 a great deal of consciousness of guilt evidence, including petitioner enlisting the
24 aid of people who avoided fingerprints by wearing socks on their hands, petitioner's
25 wearing gloves, petitioner fleeing, petitioner telling people not to talk, and
26 petitioner purportedly coercing witnesses (Steven Schutt, Robert Teal, Mark Teal, and
27 Larry Kirkland), and petitioner hiding the bathtub. As discussed above, it was
28 stipulated that Mark Teal and Larry Kirkland said petitioner never attempted to

1 | coerce them into giving false testimony. (RT. pp 867-868.)

2 | There are in any event several problems inherent in the use of this evidence to
3 | sustain the convictions. First, petitioner was a parolee who admitted killing
4 | someone, albeit by accident and/or in self-defense. He was at the Ranch in the course
5 | of a preplanned flight, not precisely to avoid a parole violation-which appeared
6 | inevitable-but to place his wife with family up north, and hope the prison would also
7 | let him discharge his remaining parole time there. Whatever the prosecution's quarrel
8 | with petitioner's logic, the fact he was already absconding from parole before he
9 | ever knew Land might call him at the Ranch was well established. (RT. pp 521-531.)

10 | His subsequent involvement in any form of homicide put paid to any chance he
11 | would not have his parole violated. Therefore, no consciousness of guilt could
12 | rationally be assumed to be a particularized consciousness of guilt of committing the
13 | crime charged.

14 | In point of fact, many parolees at the Ranch initially lied to police simply to
15 | avoid involvement, and the prosecutor made no attempt to charge them as accomplices
16 | or accessories to the offense, based on their guilty-seeming conduct. Yet by the
17 | same token, the extreme moral turpitude of most of these witnesses, and their wide
18 | variety of conflicting and self-serving accounts, vitiated the intrinsic worth of
19 | their testimony. Even if no criminal charges were actually likely to be filed, the
20 | prosecution was avowedly aware of most of the Ranch witnesses' criminal liability,
21 | to the extent that the trial prosecutor offered in advance to immunize most of the
22 | Ranch denizens. (RT. pp 6.)

23 | The prosecutor's open-ended offer of immunity to all but J.D. Fields (believed
24 | to have actively abetted the murder) was certainly not something common in murder
25 | cases, but it was amply justified by the record. As the trial court observed in
26 | sorting through a huge number of prior convictions to be used to impeach prosecution
27 | and defense witnesses alike, it was "no beauty contest," as far as which side had
28 | more convictions of moral turpitude. (RT. pp 9-28.) Consequently, the not particularly

1 consistent accounts of these witnesses tended to be visibly colored to favor the
2 prosecution; limit the penal exposure of each witness; and protect J.D. Fields, who
3 was at the least the son of a generous landlord who rented to parolees, and as to
4 Sarah Terry and Bonnie Fields, a lover and son.

5 Thus, while the prosecutor emphasized that these witnesses who handed the
6 prosecutor petitioner's head were petitioner's friends, the operative word here is
7 "were," because by trial these witnesses were mainly concerned with self-interest and
8 the interests of those near and dear to them. The review of their testimony conducted
9 below establishes their bias in favor of the prosecutor; the great extent as to which
10 all were impeached on crucial and basic factual issues; and the fact that as many or
11 more people depicted Land as carrying a knife, as attributed a knife to petitioner.
12 Furthermore, none of the wildly varied statements of "planning" attributed to
13 petitioner were taken as such by the jury, which did not agree there was a first
14 degree murder. Thus, deference to the jury can only go so far in sustaining this
15 verdict. In fact, the only rational inference from the whole record is that it cannot
16 be clearly ascertained with any certainty what was said, and what occurred before
17 after, and during the killing. Therefore, there was no solid evidence petitioner
18 committed any homicide which could not be legally justified or excused.

19 Sarah Terry said at trial that petitioner and his wife came to the Ranch and
20 petitioner helped her paint her bathroom for most of the day of May 25, 1999 (RT. pp
21 198-202, 205), thus at least in part confirming petitioner's account with the
22 painting, and explaining why some may have seen him with a knife he used to remove
23 trim and open cans. (RT. pp 525-527.) Sarah Terry herself recalled only Land being
24 known to carry a knife, possibly a folding knife. (RT. pp 222.) She described
25 petitioner being angry (as he claimed at trial), for the passes Land made to Sarah
26 Terry and to his wife. Terry offered no testimony of anger over drugs, or any
27 indication of methamphetamine manufacture. She said that, toward evening, petitioner
28 said Land was "fucking up" in his sexual misbehavior, and he was going to "kick his

1 ass" or give him a "knockout punch." (RT. pp 202-203, 206, 224.)

2 Per Terry, while they were painting, Dave Friese called petitioner to Bonnie
3 Fields' phone, and petitioner talked to Land there, telling Land they could make
4 money stealing the Fields' gun collection. Then petitioner told the others watching
5 television that Land was coming. All could hear at least his side of the conversation.
6 (RT. pp 203-205.) Then Terry, J.D. Fields, and petitioner waited outside the trailer
7 for Land, and J.D. went and got a coat but not a gun. Petitioner sent Terry back to
8 her own separate trailer nearby. Land drove up, and Terry looked out and saw them by
9 moonlight and exterior light. They argued, with only Land's words audible. He said,
10 "Fuck you. I haven't talked to anybody," and again, "Fuck you," then turned away,
11 turned back, opened his coat, and petitioner (without lunging) moved his hand forward
12 (perhaps with something in it). Land began to fall over. (RT. pp 203-204.)

13 This was the only eyewitness account offered by the prosecution, and it was
14 unavoidably undermined by being impeached in almost every significant respect. It did
15 nothing to confirm an informant killing/methamphetamine manufacturer scenario. While
16 it did act to refute petitioner's self-defense claims, it did not do so in a trust-
17 worthy manner. At the outset, the account was not initially offered to police, to
18 whom Sarah Terry (consistent with defense expert testimony) said she saw nothing.
19 Then police (at an unclear point) threatened to arrest Sarah Terry for lying, and
20 Bonnie Fields—who was "really furious" that J.D. Fields could be in serious trouble—
21 called police and handed the phone to a crying Sarah Terry. (RT. pp 218-219, 408.)
22 This was after all the Ranch denizens had talked a great deal regarding the incidents
23 (RT. pp 220), and J.D. and Bonnie told Terry that J.D. could be in a lot of trouble.
24 (RT. pp 220-221.) Then for the first time Terry told Detective Ryzdyski she saw
25 petitioner stab Barnes from her trailer. (RT. pp 220.) Yet her account to the
26 detective, and at trial, was suspiciously lacking in anything ever possibly
27 incriminating to J.D., whose whereabouts during the killing are extremely vague, in
28 Terry's account.

1 A reasonable trier of fact could not have avoided doubt Terry felt she had to
2 deliver petitioner to the police, to avert the danger to J.D. Fields, who was her
3 lover and Bonnie Fields' son. In addition, while Terry explained that she could see
4 what she claimed to see, because she knew the participants (RT. pp 222), in reality
5 her precise testimony on this point was that she could distinguish Land and petitioner,
6 because she knew them. That is not the same thing as saying she could see what they
7 were doing. (RT. pp 222.) In other words, with all the after-the-fact discussions of
8 events, plus pressure from J.D. and Bonnie Fields to provide persuasive prosecution
9 evidence to the police (People v. MICKLE, 54 Cal. 3d at 169), Sarah Terry went from
10 seeing some sort of fight with two people she knew, to seeing in her mind the fight
11 that the prosecution wanted. As of trial, the prosecutor still considered J.D. an
12 uncharged participant in a murder (RT. pp 6), and thus as things were going their way,
13 it behooved Terry to continue to pursue the tack which kept her boyfriend out of jail.

14 Terry initially said she saw nothing, then discussed events with others at
15 length, realized her failure to see anything was detrimental to those nearest and
16 dearest, then "saw" petitioner "stab" Land. The simplest and most logical explanation
17 for this is that Terry told the truth as she saw it in many respects at all times,
18 but her perception was altered by extraneous data after the fact, which (given her
19 need to help J.D.) Terry was unable to separate from her actual perceptions.

20 While it is the layman's view that "seeing is believing," and that the mind
21 records information much like a camera or videotape machine, eyewitness misidentification
22 is commonplace. (United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 224 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87
23 S. Ct. 1926]["The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy"].)
24 While Sarah Terry believed her familiarity with the combatants made her more able to
25 perceive at least their identities, in fact Dr. Fraser's testimony for the defense
26 made it clear that even which person was which could not be perceived in the
27 conditions prevailing at the time.

28 Rapid violent events in the dark are not readily perceived by stressed witnesses,

1 whose very stress enhances their susceptibility to suggestion. (People v. Maestas
2 (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1482, 1498-1499; Loftus and Doyle, Eyewitness Identification
3 (2d.Ed. 1992), sec.2.05, pp 17-18; United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at 228,235.)
4 Common misperceptions of how human beings perceive things with their eyes lent a
5 spurious aura of veracity to the prosecutor's argument that people can see plenty at
6 night. Yet as Dr. Fraser noted below a certain level of illumination (well above the
7 level the witnesses described to defense experts at the scene, recreating the events),
8 the cones in the eyes which enable us to see colors and edges simply do not come into
9 play. At that level of light, all that is activated are rods, which cannot as a
10 matter of physiology do more than show blurred areas of light and dark.

11 Dr. Fraser was an experienced psychologist and neurophysiologist, whose testimony
12 elucidated exactly how Sarah Terry could have sincerely thought she saw what she
13 needed to see to help her lover. He delineated the following scientific consensus as
14 to night vision at crime scenes. Below an illumination of 1 to 3 lux, nothing is
15 visible except light and dark, with no edges or boundaries. The defense experts
16 recreated the lighting and moonlight described by Terry and Friese, including a light
17 they said could have been off during the fight. The illumination totaled a fraction
18 of 1 lux. In such lighting, people fill in their perception and memory with what they
19 expect, or learn elsewhere. Due to "source amnesia"-the phenomenon whereby the brain
20 cannot distinguish what is seen from what is learned secondhand-the expected
21 observation becomes a seemingly objective memory. (RT. pp 834-863.)

22 According to Sarah Terry, when Dr. Fraser and defense investigators recreated
23 the killing, she had met the two investigators who simulated a fight; she could tell
24 which was which from her trailer window vantage point; and she could see what each
25 held in their hands, with one holding a one-liter soda bottle. (RT. pp 224-227.)
26 Actually, she mistook the one investigator for the other; no one had a soda bottle;
27 and one investigator held and waived a clipboard holding bright white paper. Also,
28 Terry volunteered to the investigators that she could not see what petitioner and

-TO BE CONTINUED