periodic review of the confinement. Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). A condition of confinement may be imposed on a pretrial detainee without violating the due process clause if it is reasonably related to a legitimate and non-punitive governmental goal; it may not be arbitrary or purposeless. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)). Safety and preventing danger to the community are legitimate governmental goals that outweigh an individual’s liberty interest, depending upon the circumstances. Id. A pretrial detainee has a right to due process before conditions or restrictions are imposed upon him only if those restrictions or conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). In the case at hand, Riker was placed in administrative, non-disciplinary segregation immediately upon booking. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 3.) This was done for safety and security reasons that the jail staff identified during the preliminary internal investigations. (Docket No. 39, ¶ 4.) There is a liberty interest in avoiding placement in a status that is atypical, but there is nothing atypical about Riker’s placement. According to Racine County Jail policy, inmates are placed in administrative segregation for a multitude of reasons, including potential safety risks to the general population. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 25.) Also, according to the policy, a subjective evaluation of potential future risk is a reason for placement in administrative segregation. (Id.) The Racine County Jail staff, which identified and evaluated potential future risks regarding Riker in general population, acted in accordance with the jail’s own policy in placing Riker in administrative segregation. Riker was not deprived of any liberty interest he possessed because his placement was in accordance with the policy governing all persons detained at the jail. Riker was dealt with in accordance with that policy and therefore, his placement cannot be considered “atypical.”
shift, in which he was allowed to use the common room/day room for recreation while the CERT team supervised him. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 21.) On July 28, 2010, Riker was out of his cell for shower and exercise when he slipped out of his belly chain. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 24.) Riker yelled racial epithets at black inmates in nearby day rooms as he swung the belly chain around, using the stillattached padlock to damage windows of the neighboring day rooms. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 24.) Lt. Brown conducted periodic reviews concerning Riker’s administrative segregation status, but Riker remained housed in administrative segregation for the remainder of his time at Racine 7 County Jail due to continued threats towards inmates and staff and destruction of property. (Docket No. 36, ¶¶ 22-23.) IV. ANALYSIS Riker claims the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. It appears that Riker, while in the Racine County Jail and during the time of the alleged constitutional violations, was a pretrial detainee. As a pretrial detainee, both claims will be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). The constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee are derived from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are distinguishable from an inmate’s right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). Although the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, detainees are entitled to at least as much protection as the constitution provides convicted prisoners. Id. (internal citations omitted). Although there is a distinction, it is of little significance in application, and courts have found it appropriate to use the same standard for claims arising out of both the Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) and the Fourteenth Amendment (pretrial detainees). Id. (citing Henderson v. Sheahan, 195 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999)). A. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim The court begins its analysis with Riker’s claim that his placement in administrative segregation upon booking, without an initial hearing, and his continued segregation status throughout his stay at the Racine County Jail, was a deprivation of due process. “A person has a liberty interest in avoiding placement in a status that is atypical and imposes a significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). If a liberty interest exists, then due process requires informal, non-adversarial, but
security reasons shown from his multiple and continued violent outbursts and threats. (Docket 36, ¶ 14.) These cell modifications included preemptive removal of items to prevent Riker from using them as weapons against people or to damage property. (Id.) In addition to the removal of items from his cell, Riker would be allowed to be out of his cell only with the Correctional Emergency Response Team (“CERT”) standing by for showering and phone use, (Docket No. 36, ¶ 15), during which time his cell would be cleaned and searched, (Docket No. 36, ¶ 16). The staff also determined that Riker would not be allowed in the dayroom without leg irons and belly chains, and made special security measures for transporting him to and from the courthouse. (Docket No. 36, ¶¶ 17- 18.) Riker claims that the belly chains and leg irons caused him severe physical injuries due to the way he had to position his body to use the phone and the mental strain of administrative segregation and limited recreation time caused severe mental and psychological injury. (Docket No. 1.) Following these security measures, Riker again on January 12, 2010 tampered with a sprinkler head but was stopped and secured to a body board when he threatened to disarm a guard carrying a taser. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 19.) On January 22, 2010, he was transferred to a cell on “2D”, where he remained for the rest of his time at the Racine County Jail. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 20.) Once in 2D, due to Riker’s prior threats, acts of violence, and repeated property damage, it was determined that Riker would be allowed out of his cell on only Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays during first
On January 6, 2010, Riker forced his solid cell door open by kicking the door with such force that the welds broke, and was then able to push the lower portion from its track, allowing him to exit the cell. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 12.) After exiting the cell, Riker used a metal electrical junction box he pried from the wall to break six cell windows, two day room windows, and nine light fixtures, depriving the jail of the use of eight cells for approximately one month. (Id.) That same day, command staff met to formulate an action plan for safely housing Riker to prevent further damage to the facility but in a manner in which he would not be able to carry out his threats. (Docket 36, ¶ 13.) At the meeting, the command staff decided Riker needed to be housed by himself in a modified cell and two man day room on administrative segregation status for safety and
phone, and exercise in the day room. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 5.) On November 28, 2009, Riker filed an inmate request/complaint demanding to be placed in general population, to which Sheriff Thompson responded and advised Riker that his classification was to ensure jail security and safety and his classification would be reviewed every ten days. (Docket No. 36, ¶¶ 6-7.) On December 20, 2009, Riker flooded his cell and broke the seat off his desk, then pounded the heavy metal seat against the cell door, causing jail staff to transfer him to a different cell. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 8.) On December 29, 2009, during a meeting with a mental health worker, Riker broke a cell door and shouted racial slurs, which were directed at other inmates. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 9.) On December 31, 2009, Riker was yelling at inmates from day rooms 2 and 3, and Officer Hernandez advised Riker to stand down. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 10.) Riker refused to stand down and yelled to “get those niggers away from the windows” and asked Officer Hernandez for “any nigger to kill.” (Id.) Riker also threatened to kick Officer Hernandez’s “ass.” (Id.) On January 2, 2010, Riker threatened staff members standing guard during his shower, specifically telling Sergeant Gonzales that “I’m gonna catch you when you don’t have five people around you. I’m gonna remember your face you fucking spic, and you’re gonna remember mine.” (Docket No. 36, ¶ 11.)
According to the defendants’ submissions in support of summary judgment, which Riker has failed to appropriately contest, Riker was booked in to the Racine County Jail on November 11, 2009, being held on numerous felony charges including multiple counts of First Degree Recklessly Endangering Safety, Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, Strangulation and Suffocation, Child Abuse—Causing Mental Harm, and Child Abuse—Intentionally Causing Harm. (Docket No. 36, ¶1-2.) While awaiting trial, Racine County Jail staff initially housed Riker in administrative segregation due to the potential safety and security threat he posed within the jail. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 3.) The Racine County Jail policy regarding administrative segregation provides that the decision to place someone in segregation can be based on purely subjective evaluations and predictions of future behavior or on informed predictions based on past behavior. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 25.) Segregation is designed to help protect those threatened by the behavior of the inmate as well to protect the inmate himself. (Id.) An inmate who displays or threatens aggressive behavior towards staff or other inmates or has any sort of disciplinary problem may need administrative segregation. (Id.) Internal investigation revealed that Riker subscribed to a white supremacist ideology, the expression of which could pose a threat to the safety of other inmates, jail staff, or Riker himself due to the ethnic and racial diversity of the general population. (Id ¶ 3.) Riker’s assignment to administrative segregation was done as a precautionary measure, pursuant to jail policy, in an effort to maintain the safety and security of the jail environment. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 4.) Inmates in administrative segregation are allowed to have one hour per day outside their cell to shower, use the
Remember Sean, the letter that you had Angel write to child protective services in Colorado stating that she would take your children and raise them when their mother went to prison. How nice of her. Well their mother never did go to prison, something you've been saying will happen anyday for, well for the last three years. And now that Angel killed herself according to you your own children would have been motherless had that unstable woman ever had the chance to take them. Women who kill themselves over men they have prison-only relationships with are crazy. And this is the woman you wanted to take your children in because she was better able to parent the children. How'd that work out for you?
wrongfully convicted On June 3, 1999 Federal prisoner David Stone was fatally stabbed on the main yard of the U.S. Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado. In August 2005, imprisoned civil rights activist Mark Jordan was wrongfully convicted of the murder after trial court excluded evidence that another prisoner and jailhouse snitch, Sean Riker (aka "joker"), actually committed the offense. See United States v Jordan, 485 F .3d 1214 (10th cir 2007). The Jordan center is offering a ten thousand dollar rewards for information that will clear Jordan's name. We are asking anyone with information regarding this case and Mr. Jordan's innocence to write: Donald Bounds Attorney at Law 1994 Lincoln Ave. Parker, Coloardo 80134
Where is Sean Riker? Why haven't [government authorities] brought him in? Mr. Collins says Sean Riker was at the table at the time of the stabbing. Mr. Collins says in one of his statements that Mr. Riker actually provided the weapon.
57 I wonder whose DNA is on that handle? Any guess?
58 Vol. XVII, at 953-954.
59 Jordan's defense counsel then goes further to implicate Mr. Riker in the crime.
60 We don't have the abilities [government authorities] have. We can't go listen to phone calls that are made by Mr. Riker or some inmate by the name of Larry or Mr. Collins to see if he has been calling anybody about this. We don't have the ability to search their cells. We don't have the ability to search DNA databases to see if Mr. Riker or other people's DNA is on the weapon.
28 First, both video and testimonial evidence placed Riker at the scene of the stabbing. The video shows Stone, Jordan, Riker and an inmate identified only as "Larry" sitting together at a concrete table several minutes before the stabbing. And Collins testified that he saw Riker and Larry seated at Stone's table prior to the stabbing.
29 Second, Collins claimed to have heard through the prison grapevine, albeit after the stabbing, that Riker had given Jordan the shank to "hit" Stone. Vol. XIV, at 371.
30 Finally, Jordan argues that unidentifiable DNA found on the shank indicates that someone else possessed the shank.
Proffered Evidence
31 The second source of supporting evidence — and the heart of this appeal — are four additional pieces of proffered evidence that Jordan claims would point the finger at Riker.
32 First, Jordan proffered evidence that, six months before the murder, Riker possessed a shank, "almost identical in size and shape" to the shank that killed Stone. Vol. XVI, at 739.
33 Second, Jordan offered statements by Riker to investigators after the stabbing indicating that he was untruthful about the circumstances surrounding Stone's death. Jordan contends that these lies reflect a "consciousness of guilt" on the part of Riker. Id. at 734.
34 Third, the defense claimed evidence shows that shortly after the stabbing prison officials investigated Riker as a possible suspect in Stone's homicide. Id. at 736. The record unfortunately does not disclose the basis for this statement.
35 Finally, Jordan claimed that Riker would testify that he and other inmates went over to a set of bleachers after the stabbing. On the top of the bleachers, investigators later found a blood-stained glove. Id. at 737.
RSS
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). A condition of confinement may be imposed on a pretrial detainee without
violating the due process clause if it is reasonably related to a legitimate and non-punitive
governmental goal; it may not be arbitrary or purposeless. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428
(7th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)). Safety and preventing
danger to the community are legitimate governmental goals that outweigh an individual’s liberty
interest, depending upon the circumstances. Id. A pretrial detainee has a right to due process before
conditions or restrictions are imposed upon him only if those restrictions or conditions amount to
punishment of the detainee. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979).
In the case at hand, Riker was placed in administrative, non-disciplinary segregation
immediately upon booking. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 3.) This was done for safety and security reasons that
the jail staff identified during the preliminary internal investigations. (Docket No. 39, ¶ 4.) There is
a liberty interest in avoiding placement in a status that is atypical, but there is nothing atypical about
Riker’s placement. According to Racine County Jail policy, inmates are placed in administrative
segregation for a multitude of reasons, including potential safety risks to the general population.
(Docket No. 36, ¶ 25.) Also, according to the policy, a subjective evaluation of potential future risk
is a reason for placement in administrative segregation. (Id.) The Racine County Jail staff, which
identified and evaluated potential future risks regarding Riker in general population, acted in
accordance with the jail’s own policy in placing Riker in administrative segregation. Riker was not
deprived of any liberty interest he possessed because his placement was in accordance with the
policy governing all persons detained at the jail. Riker was dealt with in accordance with that policy
and therefore, his placement cannot be considered “atypical.”
team supervised him. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 21.) On July 28, 2010, Riker was out of his cell for shower
and exercise when he slipped out of his belly chain. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 24.) Riker yelled racial
epithets at black inmates in nearby day rooms as he swung the belly chain around, using the stillattached
padlock to damage windows of the neighboring day rooms. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 24.)
Lt. Brown conducted periodic reviews concerning Riker’s administrative segregation status,
but Riker remained housed in administrative segregation for the remainder of his time at Racine
7
County Jail due to continued threats towards inmates and staff and destruction of property. (Docket
No. 36, ¶¶ 22-23.)
IV. ANALYSIS
Riker claims the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. It appears that Riker, while in the
Racine County Jail and during the time of the alleged constitutional violations, was a pretrial
detainee. As a pretrial detainee, both claims will be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Jackson v Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). The constitutional rights of a
pretrial detainee are derived from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are
distinguishable from an inmate’s right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Bell v Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). Although the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees,
detainees are entitled to at least as much protection as the constitution provides convicted prisoners.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Although there is a distinction, it is of little significance in
application, and courts have found it appropriate to use the same standard for claims arising out of
both the Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) and the Fourteenth Amendment (pretrial
detainees). Id. (citing Henderson v. Sheahan, 195 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999)).
A. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim
The court begins its analysis with Riker’s claim that his placement in administrative
segregation upon booking, without an initial hearing, and his continued segregation status
throughout his stay at the Racine County Jail, was a deprivation of due process. “A person has a
liberty interest in avoiding placement in a status that is atypical and imposes a significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
484 (1995). If a liberty interest exists, then due process requires informal, non-adversarial, but
14.) These cell modifications included preemptive removal of items to prevent Riker from using
them as weapons against people or to damage property. (Id.) In addition to the removal of items
from his cell, Riker would be allowed to be out of his cell only with the Correctional Emergency
Response Team (“CERT”) standing by for showering and phone use, (Docket No. 36, ¶ 15), during
which time his cell would be cleaned and searched, (Docket No. 36, ¶ 16). The staff also determined
that Riker would not be allowed in the dayroom without leg irons and belly chains, and made
special security measures for transporting him to and from the courthouse. (Docket No. 36, ¶¶ 17-
18.) Riker claims that the belly chains and leg irons caused him severe physical injuries due to the
way he had to position his body to use the phone and the mental strain of administrative segregation
and limited recreation time caused severe mental and psychological injury. (Docket No. 1.)
Following these security measures, Riker again on January 12, 2010 tampered with a
sprinkler head but was stopped and secured to a body board when he threatened to disarm a guard
carrying a taser. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 19.) On January 22, 2010, he was transferred to a cell on “2D”,
where he remained for the rest of his time at the Racine County Jail. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 20.) Once in
2D, due to Riker’s prior threats, acts of violence, and repeated property damage, it was determined
that Riker would be allowed out of his cell on only Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays during first
force that the welds broke, and was then able to push the lower portion from its track, allowing him
to exit the cell. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 12.) After exiting the cell, Riker used a metal electrical junction
box he pried from the wall to break six cell windows, two day room windows, and nine light
fixtures, depriving the jail of the use of eight cells for approximately one month. (Id.) That same
day, command staff met to formulate an action plan for safely housing Riker to prevent further
damage to the facility but in a manner in which he would not be able to carry out his threats.
(Docket 36, ¶ 13.) At the meeting, the command staff decided Riker needed to be housed by himself
in a modified cell and two man day room on administrative segregation status for safety and
inmate request/complaint demanding to be placed in general population, to which Sheriff Thompson
responded and advised Riker that his classification was to ensure jail security and safety and his
classification would be reviewed every ten days. (Docket No. 36, ¶¶ 6-7.)
On December 20, 2009, Riker flooded his cell and broke the seat off his desk, then pounded
the heavy metal seat against the cell door, causing jail staff to transfer him to a different cell.
(Docket No. 36, ¶ 8.) On December 29, 2009, during a meeting with a mental health worker, Riker
broke a cell door and shouted racial slurs, which were directed at other inmates. (Docket No. 36, ¶
9.) On December 31, 2009, Riker was yelling at inmates from day rooms 2 and 3, and Officer
Hernandez advised Riker to stand down. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 10.) Riker refused to stand down and
yelled to “get those niggers away from the windows” and asked Officer Hernandez for “any nigger
to kill.” (Id.) Riker also threatened to kick Officer Hernandez’s “ass.” (Id.) On January 2, 2010,
Riker threatened staff members standing guard during his shower, specifically telling Sergeant
Gonzales that “I’m gonna catch you when you don’t have five people around you. I’m gonna
remember your face you fucking spic, and you’re gonna remember mine.” (Docket No. 36, ¶ 11.)
failed to appropriately contest, Riker was booked in to the Racine County Jail on November 11,
2009, being held on numerous felony charges including multiple counts of First Degree Recklessly
Endangering Safety, Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, Strangulation and Suffocation, Child
Abuse—Causing Mental Harm, and Child Abuse—Intentionally Causing Harm. (Docket No. 36,
¶1-2.) While awaiting trial, Racine County Jail staff initially housed Riker in administrative
segregation due to the potential safety and security threat he posed within the jail. (Docket No. 36, ¶
3.) The Racine County Jail policy regarding administrative segregation provides that the decision to
place someone in segregation can be based on purely subjective evaluations and predictions of
future behavior or on informed predictions based on past behavior. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 25.)
Segregation is designed to help protect those threatened by the behavior of the inmate as well to
protect the inmate himself. (Id.) An inmate who displays or threatens aggressive behavior towards
staff or other inmates or has any sort of disciplinary problem may need administrative segregation.
(Id.)
Internal investigation revealed that Riker subscribed to a white supremacist ideology, the
expression of which could pose a threat to the safety of other inmates, jail staff, or Riker himself
due to the ethnic and racial diversity of the general population. (Id ¶ 3.) Riker’s assignment to
administrative segregation was done as a precautionary measure, pursuant to jail policy, in an effort
to maintain the safety and security of the jail environment. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 4.) Inmates in
administrative segregation are allowed to have one hour per day outside their cell to shower, use the
On June 3, 1999 Federal prisoner David Stone was fatally stabbed on the main yard of the U.S. Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado. In August 2005, imprisoned civil rights activist Mark Jordan was wrongfully convicted of the murder after trial court excluded evidence that another prisoner and jailhouse snitch, Sean Riker (aka "joker"), actually committed the offense. See United States v Jordan, 485 F .3d 1214 (10th cir 2007). The Jordan center is offering a ten thousand dollar rewards for information that will clear Jordan's name. We are asking anyone with information regarding this case and Mr. Jordan's innocence to write:
Donald Bounds
Attorney at Law
1994 Lincoln Ave.
Parker, Coloardo 80134
57
I wonder whose DNA is on that handle? Any guess?
58
Vol. XVII, at 953-954.
59
Jordan's defense counsel then goes further to implicate Mr. Riker in the crime.
60
We don't have the abilities [government authorities] have. We can't go listen to phone calls that are made by Mr. Riker or some inmate by the name of Larry or Mr. Collins to see if he has been calling anybody about this. We don't have the ability to search their cells. We don't have the ability to search DNA databases to see if Mr. Riker or other people's DNA is on the weapon.
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/485/485.F3d.1214.06-1161.html
28
First, both video and testimonial evidence placed Riker at the scene of the stabbing. The video shows Stone, Jordan, Riker and an inmate identified only as "Larry" sitting together at a concrete table several minutes before the stabbing. And Collins testified that he saw Riker and Larry seated at Stone's table prior to the stabbing.
29
Second, Collins claimed to have heard through the prison grapevine, albeit after the stabbing, that Riker had given Jordan the shank to "hit" Stone. Vol. XIV, at 371.
30
Finally, Jordan argues that unidentifiable DNA found on the shank indicates that someone else possessed the shank.
Proffered Evidence
31
The second source of supporting evidence — and the heart of this appeal — are four additional pieces of proffered evidence that Jordan claims would point the finger at Riker.
32
First, Jordan proffered evidence that, six months before the murder, Riker possessed a shank, "almost identical in size and shape" to the shank that killed Stone. Vol. XVI, at 739.
33
Second, Jordan offered statements by Riker to investigators after the stabbing indicating that he was untruthful about the circumstances surrounding Stone's death. Jordan contends that these lies reflect a "consciousness of guilt" on the part of Riker. Id. at 734.
34
Third, the defense claimed evidence shows that shortly after the stabbing prison officials investigated Riker as a possible suspect in Stone's homicide. Id. at 736. The record unfortunately does not disclose the basis for this statement.
35
Finally, Jordan claimed that Riker would testify that he and other inmates went over to a set of bleachers after the stabbing. On the top of the bleachers, investigators later found a blood-stained glove. Id. at 737.