need to keep him segregated from the general population. Nor was Riker’s confinement cruel and unusual. He was not deprived of any basic human need. The staff imposed very limiting conditions, but these were done out of necessity due to Riker’s uncontrollable destructive and threatening behavior. For these reasons, the court concludes that there was no violation of due process and 13 further concludes that the conditions of confinement did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 35), is granted. The clerk shall enter judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint and this action. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 13th day of July, 2012. ______________________ AARON E. GOODSTEIN U.S. Magistrate Judge
Riker claims severe mental and physical injuries, but shows no evidence as to the existence or severity of these alleged injuries. Injured or not, the jail staff did not act with deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement, but acted out of necessity and concerns for safety. The planning and the diligence of the staff demonstrate that concerns for safety were taken into account, not just for Riker, but everyone. The intent of the staff was never to harm Riker and the actions taken were in accordance with legitimate penalogical policies. The irons and chains and limited recreation time were conditions necessitated by Riker’s violent behavior and threats; they were not imposed for the purpose of punishment. The fact that Riker was uncomfortable and his living situation was not free from restraint does not make the confinement conditions unconstitutional. The court finds that the staff acted for a legitimate governmental purpose; the conditions were necessary to restrain the uncontrollable Riker, and the conditions were not so severe as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment. V. CONCLUSION The jail staff did not violate Riker’s liberty interest when they placed Riker in administrative segregation, as his status and placement followed the procedures in the jail. Because his placement was for a legitimate governmental goal, one which outweighed any liberty interest, there was no due process violation. Neither were Riker’s continued placement and limiting conditions a violation of due process because Riker was treated in accordance with an appropriate review procedure. His continued administrative status was warranted due to his behavior and the
but preventing access to the yard to protect prison staff from violent behavior is reasonable, regardless of the time. Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001). “To confine in ‘solitary’ a prisoner who behaves like a wild beast whenever he is let out of his cell is the least cruel measure . . . for dealing with such a person.” Id. In the case at hand, Riker was not completely deprived of his time out of his cell. At the onset of administrative segregation, Riker was allowed his mandatory one hour per day recreation time. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 5.) This privilege was slowly taken away because of Riker’s violent acts, threats, and property damage any time he was let out of his cell. Although his recreation time was diminished, it was never completely taken away. At the end of his stay in Racine County Jail, Riker was still allowed out of his modified cell three days a week, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 21.) He was to be in belly chain and leg irons while out of the dayroom. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 17.) These conditions of confinement are fully compliant with the enunciated standards as to what is, and is not, cruel and unusual. Riker was not denied any basic human need, as he was still allowed out of his cell to shower and use the phone, and he makes no claims of lack of food, water, or other basic necessity.
Due to the necessity and purpose of the stricter confinement, and the periodic reviews throughout his segregations status, the court finds no violation of due process in Riker’s continued segregation status. The defendants have presented the measures taken to restrain Riker, but Riker claims that the multiple incident reports and continued misconduct warranting the restrictions are “lies and half truths.” (Docket No. 41.) Although he makes this conclusory assertion, he has not presented anything specific to place these facts in dispute. The court concludes that the conditions imposed on the plaintiff were not punishment and did not violate due process. B. Plaintiff’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim The court now looks to whether or not the conditions of the Riker’s confinement in administrative segregation amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Riker claims that the conditions of his confinement, most notably his restriction on recreation and yard time, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. As noted above, because Riker was a pretrial detainee, his claim is to be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere fact that pretrial detention interferes with a person’s desire to live comfortably and free from restraint does not by itself make the conditions unconstitutional. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2005). In order to be cruel and unusual, there must be a denial of “basic 11 human needs” or the “minimum measure of life’s necessity” Rhoades v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Claims of cruel and unusual punishment require the plaintiff to show he has suffered an objectively, sufficiently serious injury, and that prison staff inflicted the injury with deliberate indifference. Framer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The standard for deliberate indifference is that the defendant committed an act so dangerous that his knowledge of the risk can be inferred or that the defendant knew of an impending harm. Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1427 (citing Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1995)). In terms of length of confinement with recreation restrictions, more than 90 days of confinement without yard time is considered cruel and unusual,
Riker, along with his initial placement, also complains of his continued segregation status with limiting conditions, and continued denials of requests to be in general population. Riker was not deprived of any procedure since his status was reviewed periodically, every 10-14 days, and his continued requests were read and considered. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 22.) Wearing instructed Brown to conduct these reviews, and they were carried out. (Docket No. 38, ¶ 10.) As indicated, due process requires only informal, non-adversarial, periodic reviews of status. The decisions made thereafter not to return Riker to the general population are fully justified based on his actions damaging property damage and his threats to staff and other inmates while in administrative segregation. (See Docket No. 36, ¶ 23.) Continued placement in administrative segregation was warranted for the same reasons he was initially placed there—safety risks to the prison community. It is not difficult to see that Riker posed a threat to the general population, and his conduct warranted his stricter limiting conditions within administrative segregation. These stricter conditions were not punishment or retribution, but necessary measures to ensure the safety of the staff and other inmates. Riker was able to destroy property and even escape from his cell and belly chain, so the heightened conditions were necessary to make sure that Riker was physically unable to continue the property damage and potentially carry out one of his many threats to staff and other inmates. The restraint measures may have been a hardship for Riker, but they were necessary.
Riker was not deprived of any liberty interest he possessed because his placement was in accordance with the policy governing all persons detained at the jail. Riker was dealt with in accordance with that policy and therefore, his placement cannot be considered “atypical.” 9 Of course, Riker has a liberty interest in avoiding placement for no reason or for reasons that are baseless. This is where adherence to the jail policy regarding placement in administrative segregation is critical. Given the facts of this case, the policy was followed and Riker’s placement was warranted. There is no due process violation because Riker’s placement and subsequent conditions were reasonably related to a non-punitive governmental goal—safety to the general prison community, staff and inmates alike. Riker’s placement was not punishment for any conduct, but was done for his benefit and the benefit of his fellow inmates and the prison staff. The staff recognized the potential security and safety risks that could result from Riker’s expression of his racist attitudes within the ethnically and racially diverse general prison population. The staff was legitimately concerned that Riker’s continued presence in the general population would be the fuel to create an explosive situation, endangering the safety of inmates, staff, and Riker. The safety risks to the prison community presented by Riker’s attitudes and behavior far outweigh any liberty interest Riker may have had in avoiding placement. Since this is a legitimate goal and jail policy was followed, there is no violation of due process.
the jail staff identified during the preliminary internal investigations. (Docket No. 39, ¶ 4.) There is a liberty interest in avoiding placement in a status that is atypical, but there is nothing atypical about Riker’s placement. According to Racine County Jail policy, inmates are placed in administrative segregation for a multitude of reasons, including potential safety risks to the general population. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 25.) Also, according to the policy, a subjective evaluation of potential future risk is a reason for placement in administrative segregation. (Id.) The Racine County Jail staff, which identified and evaluated potential future risks regarding Riker in general population, acted in accordance with the jail’s own policy in placing Riker in administrative segregation. Riker was not deprived of any liberty interest he possessed because his placement was in accordance
Id. (internal citations omitted). Although there is a distinction, it is of little significance in application, and courts have found it appropriate to use the same standard for claims arising out of both the Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) and the Fourteenth Amendment (pretrial detainees). Id. (citing Henderson v. Sheahan, 195 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999)). A. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim The court begins its analysis with Riker’s claim that his placement in administrative segregation upon booking, without an initial hearing, and his continued segregation status throughout his stay at the Racine County Jail, was a deprivation of due process. “A person has a liberty interest in avoiding placement in a status that is atypical and imposes a significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). If a liberty interest exists, then due process requires informal, non-adversarial, but 8 periodic review of the confinement. Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). A condition of confinement may be imposed on a pretrial detainee without violating the due process clause if it is reasonably related to a legitimate and non-punitive governmental goal; it may not be arbitrary or purposeless. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)). Safety and preventing danger to the community are legitimate governmental goals that outweigh an individual’s liberty interest, depending upon the circumstances. Id. A pretrial detainee has a right to due process before conditions or restrictions are imposed upon him only if those restrictions or conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). In the case at hand, Riker was placed in administrative, non-disciplinary segregation immediately upon booking. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 3.) This was done for safety and security reasons that
cell for shower and exercise when he slipped out of his belly chain. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 24.) Riker yelled racial epithets at black inmates in nearby day rooms as he swung the belly chain around, using the stillattached padlock to damage windows of the neighboring day rooms. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 24.) Lt. Brown conducted periodic reviews concerning Riker’s administrative segregation status, but Riker remained housed in administrative segregation for the remainder of his time at Racine 7 County Jail due to continued threats towards inmates and staff and destruction of property. (Docket No. 36, ¶¶ 22-23.) IV. ANALYSIS Riker claims the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. It appears that Riker, while in the Racine County Jail and during the time of the alleged constitutional violations, was a pretrial detainee. As a pretrial detainee, both claims will be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). The constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee are derived from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are distinguishable from an inmate’s right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). Although the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, detainees are entitled to at least as much protection as the constitution provides convicted prisoners.
security reasons shown from his multiple and continued violent outbursts and threats. (Docket 36, ¶ 14.) These cell modifications included preemptive removal of items to prevent Riker from using them as weapons against people or to damage property. (Id.) In addition to the removal of items from his cell, Riker would be allowed to be out of his cell only with the Correctional Emergency Response Team (“CERT”) standing by for showering and phone use, (Docket No. 36, ¶ 15), during which time his cell would be cleaned and searched, (Docket No. 36, ¶ 16). The staff also determined that Riker would not be allowed in the dayroom without leg irons and belly chains, and made special security measures for transporting him to and from the courthouse. (Docket No. 36, ¶¶ 17- 18.) Riker claims that the belly chains and leg irons caused him severe physical injuries due to the way he had to position his body to use the phone and the mental strain of administrative segregation and limited recreation time caused severe mental and psychological injury. (Docket No. 1.) Following these security measures, Riker again on January 12, 2010 tampered with a sprinkler head but was stopped and secured to a body board when he threatened to disarm a guard carrying a taser. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 19.) On January 22, 2010, he was transferred to a cell on “2D”, where he remained for the rest of his time at the Racine County Jail. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 20.) Once in 2D, due to Riker’s prior threats, acts of violence, and repeated property damage, it was determined that Riker would be allowed out of his cell on only Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays during first shift, in which he was allowed to use the common room/day room for recreation while the CERT team supervised him. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 21.) On July 28, 2010, Riker was out of his
RSS
unusual. He was not deprived of any basic human need. The staff imposed very limiting conditions,
but these were done out of necessity due to Riker’s uncontrollable destructive and threatening
behavior. For these reasons, the court concludes that there was no violation of due process and
13
further concludes that the conditions of confinement did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
(Docket No. 35), is granted. The clerk shall enter judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint and
this action.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 13th day of July, 2012.
______________________
AARON E. GOODSTEIN
U.S. Magistrate Judge
or severity of these alleged injuries. Injured or not, the jail staff did not act with deliberate
indifference to his conditions of confinement, but acted out of necessity and concerns for safety.
The planning and the diligence of the staff demonstrate that concerns for safety were taken into
account, not just for Riker, but everyone. The intent of the staff was never to harm Riker and the
actions taken were in accordance with legitimate penalogical policies. The irons and chains and
limited recreation time were conditions necessitated by Riker’s violent behavior and threats; they
were not imposed for the purpose of punishment.
The fact that Riker was uncomfortable and his living situation was not free from restraint
does not make the confinement conditions unconstitutional. The court finds that the staff acted for a
legitimate governmental purpose; the conditions were necessary to restrain the uncontrollable Riker,
and the conditions were not so severe as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The jail staff did not violate Riker’s liberty interest when they placed Riker in
administrative segregation, as his status and placement followed the procedures in the jail. Because
his placement was for a legitimate governmental goal, one which outweighed any liberty interest,
there was no due process violation. Neither were Riker’s continued placement and limiting
conditions a violation of due process because Riker was treated in accordance with an appropriate
review procedure. His continued administrative status was warranted due to his behavior and the
regardless of the time. Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001). “To confine in
‘solitary’ a prisoner who behaves like a wild beast whenever he is let out of his cell is the least cruel
measure . . . for dealing with such a person.” Id.
In the case at hand, Riker was not completely deprived of his time out of his cell. At the
onset of administrative segregation, Riker was allowed his mandatory one hour per day recreation
time. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 5.) This privilege was slowly taken away because of Riker’s violent acts,
threats, and property damage any time he was let out of his cell. Although his recreation time was
diminished, it was never completely taken away. At the end of his stay in Racine County Jail, Riker
was still allowed out of his modified cell three days a week, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
(Docket No. 36, ¶ 21.) He was to be in belly chain and leg irons while out of the dayroom. (Docket
No. 36, ¶ 17.) These conditions of confinement are fully compliant with the enunciated standards as
to what is, and is not, cruel and unusual. Riker was not denied any basic human need, as he was still
allowed out of his cell to shower and use the phone, and he makes no claims of lack of food, water,
or other basic necessity.
to the necessity and purpose of the stricter confinement, and the periodic reviews throughout his
segregations status, the court finds no violation of due process in Riker’s continued segregation
status.
The defendants have presented the measures taken to restrain Riker, but Riker claims that
the multiple incident reports and continued misconduct warranting the restrictions are “lies and half
truths.” (Docket No. 41.) Although he makes this conclusory assertion, he has not presented
anything specific to place these facts in dispute. The court concludes that the conditions imposed on
the plaintiff were not punishment and did not violate due process.
B. Plaintiff’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
The court now looks to whether or not the conditions of the Riker’s confinement in
administrative segregation amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Riker claims that the
conditions of his confinement, most notably his restriction on recreation and yard time, subjected
him to cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. As noted above,
because Riker was a pretrial detainee, his claim is to be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The mere fact that pretrial detention interferes with a person’s desire to live comfortably and
free from restraint does not by itself make the conditions unconstitutional. Board v. Farnham, 394
F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2005). In order to be cruel and unusual, there must be a denial of “basic
11
human needs” or the “minimum measure of life’s necessity” Rhoades v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981). Claims of cruel and unusual punishment require the plaintiff to show he has suffered an
objectively, sufficiently serious injury, and that prison staff inflicted the injury with deliberate
indifference. Framer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The standard for deliberate indifference
is that the defendant committed an act so dangerous that his knowledge of the risk can be inferred or
that the defendant knew of an impending harm. Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1427 (citing Miller v.
Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1995)). In terms of length of confinement with recreation
restrictions, more than 90 days of confinement without yard time is considered cruel and unusual,
with limiting conditions, and continued denials of requests to be in general population. Riker was
not deprived of any procedure since his status was reviewed periodically, every 10-14 days, and his
continued requests were read and considered. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 22.) Wearing instructed Brown to
conduct these reviews, and they were carried out. (Docket No. 38, ¶ 10.) As indicated, due process
requires only informal, non-adversarial, periodic reviews of status. The decisions made thereafter
not to return Riker to the general population are fully justified based on his actions damaging
property damage and his threats to staff and other inmates while in administrative segregation. (See
Docket No. 36, ¶ 23.) Continued placement in administrative segregation was warranted for the
same reasons he was initially placed there—safety risks to the prison community.
It is not difficult to see that Riker posed a threat to the general population, and his conduct
warranted his stricter limiting conditions within administrative segregation. These stricter
conditions were not punishment or retribution, but necessary measures to ensure the safety of the
staff and other inmates. Riker was able to destroy property and even escape from his cell and belly
chain, so the heightened conditions were necessary to make sure that Riker was physically unable to
continue the property damage and potentially carry out one of his many threats to staff and other
inmates. The restraint measures may have been a hardship for Riker, but they were necessary.
deprived of any liberty interest he possessed because his placement was in accordance with the
policy governing all persons detained at the jail. Riker was dealt with in accordance with that policy
and therefore, his placement cannot be considered “atypical.”
9
Of course, Riker has a liberty interest in avoiding placement for no reason or for reasons that
are baseless. This is where adherence to the jail policy regarding placement in administrative
segregation is critical. Given the facts of this case, the policy was followed and Riker’s placement
was warranted. There is no due process violation because Riker’s placement and subsequent
conditions were reasonably related to a non-punitive governmental goal—safety to the general
prison community, staff and inmates alike. Riker’s placement was not punishment for any conduct,
but was done for his benefit and the benefit of his fellow inmates and the prison staff. The staff
recognized the potential security and safety risks that could result from Riker’s expression of his
racist attitudes within the ethnically and racially diverse general prison population. The staff was
legitimately concerned that Riker’s continued presence in the general population would be the fuel
to create an explosive situation, endangering the safety of inmates, staff, and Riker. The safety risks
to the prison community presented by Riker’s attitudes and behavior far outweigh any liberty
interest Riker may have had in avoiding placement. Since this is a legitimate goal and jail policy
was followed, there is no violation of due process.
a liberty interest in avoiding placement in a status that is atypical, but there is nothing atypical about
Riker’s placement. According to Racine County Jail policy, inmates are placed in administrative
segregation for a multitude of reasons, including potential safety risks to the general population.
(Docket No. 36, ¶ 25.) Also, according to the policy, a subjective evaluation of potential future risk
is a reason for placement in administrative segregation. (Id.) The Racine County Jail staff, which
identified and evaluated potential future risks regarding Riker in general population, acted in
accordance with the jail’s own policy in placing Riker in administrative segregation. Riker was not
deprived of any liberty interest he possessed because his placement was in accordance
application, and courts have found it appropriate to use the same standard for claims arising out of
both the Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) and the Fourteenth Amendment (pretrial
detainees). Id. (citing Henderson v. Sheahan, 195 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999)).
A. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim
The court begins its analysis with Riker’s claim that his placement in administrative
segregation upon booking, without an initial hearing, and his continued segregation status
throughout his stay at the Racine County Jail, was a deprivation of due process. “A person has a
liberty interest in avoiding placement in a status that is atypical and imposes a significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
484 (1995). If a liberty interest exists, then due process requires informal, non-adversarial, but
8
periodic review of the confinement. Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). A condition of confinement may be imposed on a pretrial detainee without
violating the due process clause if it is reasonably related to a legitimate and non-punitive
governmental goal; it may not be arbitrary or purposeless. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428
(7th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)). Safety and preventing
danger to the community are legitimate governmental goals that outweigh an individual’s liberty
interest, depending upon the circumstances. Id. A pretrial detainee has a right to due process before
conditions or restrictions are imposed upon him only if those restrictions or conditions amount to
punishment of the detainee. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979).
In the case at hand, Riker was placed in administrative, non-disciplinary segregation
immediately upon booking. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 3.) This was done for safety and security reasons that
and exercise when he slipped out of his belly chain. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 24.) Riker yelled racial
epithets at black inmates in nearby day rooms as he swung the belly chain around, using the stillattached
padlock to damage windows of the neighboring day rooms. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 24.)
Lt. Brown conducted periodic reviews concerning Riker’s administrative segregation status,
but Riker remained housed in administrative segregation for the remainder of his time at Racine
7
County Jail due to continued threats towards inmates and staff and destruction of property. (Docket
No. 36, ¶¶ 22-23.)
IV. ANALYSIS
Riker claims the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. It appears that Riker, while in the
Racine County Jail and during the time of the alleged constitutional violations, was a pretrial
detainee. As a pretrial detainee, both claims will be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Jackson v Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). The constitutional rights of a
pretrial detainee are derived from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are
distinguishable from an inmate’s right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Bell v Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). Although the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees,
detainees are entitled to at least as much protection as the constitution provides convicted prisoners.
14.) These cell modifications included preemptive removal of items to prevent Riker from using
them as weapons against people or to damage property. (Id.) In addition to the removal of items
from his cell, Riker would be allowed to be out of his cell only with the Correctional Emergency
Response Team (“CERT”) standing by for showering and phone use, (Docket No. 36, ¶ 15), during
which time his cell would be cleaned and searched, (Docket No. 36, ¶ 16). The staff also determined
that Riker would not be allowed in the dayroom without leg irons and belly chains, and made
special security measures for transporting him to and from the courthouse. (Docket No. 36, ¶¶ 17-
18.) Riker claims that the belly chains and leg irons caused him severe physical injuries due to the
way he had to position his body to use the phone and the mental strain of administrative segregation
and limited recreation time caused severe mental and psychological injury. (Docket No. 1.)
Following these security measures, Riker again on January 12, 2010 tampered with a
sprinkler head but was stopped and secured to a body board when he threatened to disarm a guard
carrying a taser. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 19.) On January 22, 2010, he was transferred to a cell on “2D”,
where he remained for the rest of his time at the Racine County Jail. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 20.) Once in
2D, due to Riker’s prior threats, acts of violence, and repeated property damage, it was determined
that Riker would be allowed out of his cell on only Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays during first
shift, in which he was allowed to use the common room/day room for recreation while the CERT
team supervised him. (Docket No. 36, ¶ 21.) On July 28, 2010, Riker was out of his